Why successful negotiations illustrate the necessity of a restrained U.S. foreign policy
The Houthi ceasefire has been heralded by the Trump administration as a win, with the U.S. and Yemen agreeing to end hostilities after nearly two years of air strikes. While the peace agreement is certainly a plus on the Trump administration’s foreign policy record, its necessity points to a deeper vulnerability in U.S. foreign policy that has yet to be remedied.
The U.S. has been engaged in hostilities with the Houthis since late 2023, following the group’s seizure of a cargo ship and escalation in the targeting of vessels passing through the Red Sea. In the last two years, these attacks have sunk two vessels, damaged dozens of others, and forced major shipping companies to divert to alternate routes. The initial response by the U.S. was the formation of “Operation Prosperity Guardian”, a multilateral coalition focused on ensuring security in the Red Sea. The more recent and largely unilateral “Operation Rough Rider”, initiated in March by the second Trump administration, continued to escalate U.S. engagement through a highly intensive and sustained bombardment of launch sites and other Houthi military targets.
The negotiated ceasefire demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses we may expect from the Trump administration’s foreign policy going forward. Additionally, it highlights a deeper need for a restrained approach by U.S. policymakers when considering military involvement, particularly against non-state actors.
On one hand, the willingness of the United States to sit down at the negotiating table exhibits the affinity for transactional bargaining that President Trump has touted since the onset of his second administration. An openness to diplomatic discussion and preference for unilateral negotiated agreements could create opportunities for policymakers in DC to exercise restraint in foreign policy and avoid further costly entanglements while protecting U.S. security interests. The idea of the U.S. negotiating with a nonstate actor like the Houthis and coming to a ceasefire deal would have been unheard of ten years ago, yet it is exactly this type of calculated bargaining that may be central to avoiding future entrenchment in foreign conflicts.
At the same time, the ceasefire deal with the Houthis warrants a reflection by policymakers in DC on deeper shortcomings in U.S. foreign policy concerning how best to approach asymmetric and nontraditional threats. While it is easy to view this as a low-cost military engagement, given the absence of American boots on the ground, the reality is that by involving American forces at all, even just air power, American lives and resources were still placed at risk.
The U.S. has spent an estimated $7 billion on fighting the Houthis since October 2023, with the highly intensive Operation Rough Rider costing $1 billion in the first three weeks alone. Each munition fired can cost between 1 and 4.5 million dollars, while the costs of maintaining fleet deployments and replenishing missile stocks have continued to climb, particularly given the intensity of U.S. bombardments in the spring.
The financial burden and risk exposure assumed by the U.S. in the Red Sea illustrate the ease at which American leadership continues to entangle our armed forces in foreign conflicts, as well as a failure in U.S. defense planning to effectively address security threats posed by non-state entities. While the initial multilateral coalition brought together a diverse consortium of states, the U.S. continued to shoulder the financial and material costs of combating the security threat posed by the Houthis.
Continuing to engage in conflicts globally, even without the deployment of ground troops, is a slippery slope, and is never without consequences. The timing of the ceasefire deal indicates potential concern in the Trump administration around the financial and material costs of continuing to sustain the resource intensive “Operation Rough Rider”. While securing major arteries of global trade is without doubt a priority for American geopolitical and economic interests, the U.S. is far from the only country impacted by disruptions to shipping through the Red Sea. Yet, the U.S. remained the overarching contributor to multilateral efforts, with the UK contributing an estimated $25 million, Greece and Denmark offering frigates, and the remainder of participating nations supplying handfuls of officers. Looking forward, U.S. policymakers should take Operation Rough Rider as a lesson in the need for restraint and burden sharing to go hand in hand.
Whether the ceasefire will prove durable is yet to be seen, but the settlement of a negotiated ceasefire and avoidance of unnecessary military entrenchment is a positive sign for current U.S. foreign policy. A major critique by experts has pointed to the fact that the bilateral nature of the deal leaves non-U.S. targets in the Red Sea and more broadly in the region still vulnerable. While the agreement is certainly narrow and does little to include security provisions for non-U.S. entities, pundits and policymakers alike should keep in mind that American foreign policy must prioritize the protection of American interests, in this case choosing a direct deal rather than pursuing broad, watered down negotiations. Looking ahead, policymakers should reflect on why a formal ceasefire became necessary between the world’s most capable military force and a non-state militia, and how military entrenchments against non-state threats can be avoided through a more restrained use of force going forward.
Violet Collins is an MSc graduate focused on defense and security policy.
